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Konstantin Gluschenko




Assessing a feasible degree of product market integration  





Perfect integration eludes the real world, so we suggest a realistic benchmark standard for 
judging the extent of market integration in various economies. We estimate the degree of 
integration in the US product market, widely acknowledged to be the most integrated 
among geographically large economies, so as to provide a reference for measuring Russian 
market integration. Prices for 27 grocery items across 29 cities of the United States in the 
first quarter of 2000 are used as empirical data. The estimated degree of integration turns 
out to be very close to values obtained for Russia for 2000. Apparently, market integration 
in Russia has in recent years moved toward conditions found in advanced market econo-
mies. The roles of other factors that could potentially cause segmentation of the US market 
are also analyzed. 
 
JEL Classification: F14, F15, L81, R1 
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Assessing a feasible degree of product market integration  






Esittelemme tässä työssä realistisen tavan mitata maantieteellisesti erillisten markkinoiden 
integraatiota. Ensin arvioimme, kuinka integroituneita Yhdysvaltain markkinat ovat. Yh-
dysvallat on relevantti vertauskohde, koska se on suuri maa ja koska sen markkinoiden kat-
sotaan olevan kaikkein integroituneimmat. Empiirisissä laskelmissa käytämme 27 tuotteen 
hintoja 29 yhdysvaltalaisessa kaupungissa vuoden 2000 ensimmäisellä neljänneksellä. 
Näin estimoitu integraation aste on hyvin lähellä Venäjän vastaavaa integroituneisuutta. 
Voidaan siis päätellä, että Venäjän markkinoiden integraatio on vuosien aikana lisääntynyt 
niin, että se vastaa kehittyneiden markkinatalousmaiden integraatiota. Tutkimme myös te-
kijöitä, jotka voivat aiheuttaa markkinoiden segmentaatiota Yhdysvalloissa. 
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1  Introduction 
 
One way to judge the extent of market integration in Russia (or any spatially dispersed 
market, for that matter) is to compare it against a theoretical ideal, a perfect integration. 
Such an ideal benchmark (controlled for transportation costs), however, can only suggest 
whether a particular market matches that ideal; it is silent as to the implications of the de-
viation. Gluschenko (2003), for example, estimates the degree of Russia’s market segmen-
tation in 2000 to be in the range of 0.05 to 0.10 (i.e. because of market frictions, a 1% 
change in the per capita income difference between regions induces a 0.05% to 0.1% 
change in the price difference). We now tackle the question that figure raises: Is this a lot 
or a little? 
Under the strict standards of perfect integration, there is no way to deem the Rus-
sian economic space as “single.” Indeed, Berkowitz and DeJong (2001, 2003) and 
Gluschenko (2003, 2004) find the Russian market far from integrated. As comparison to 
perfect integration would likely to overstate the shortcomings of Russia’s product market, 
we suggest a realistic standard could provide more fruitful comparisons. 
We thus hypothesize the existence of an upper bound of spatial integration, or con-
versely, a non-zero lower bound of segmentation, that is practically achievable. The feasi-
ble degree of integration seems a more reasonable benchmark for measuring market inte-
gration of domestic and international markets.  
Establishing the theoretical means for defining such a boundary presents a daunting 
task. While field studies of actual arbitrage (especially institutional aspects) would likely 
provide insight into this mechanism, it is sufficient for our purposes here to use an actual 
market as the standard. The reference market used should cover a fairly large territory. 
Given that Russia occupies about a sixth of the world’s land area, the choices are limited. 
Among large markets, there is a consensus that the US goods market is the most inte-
grated.
1 We take it as our benchmark to measure integration of the Russian market. 
Despite an excellent transportation system, a highly developed market infrastruc-
ture, and an also complete absence of local protectionism in US product markets (thanks to 
                                                 
1 For example, Parsley and Wei (2002) write: “The goods market which is the most integrated is the United 
States.” However, in an earlier paper, Parsley and Wei (2001) give grounds to believe that the Japanese mar-
ket is more integrated than the US market. Notably, Japan is about the size of California in geographic terms.  Konstantin Gluschenko and Darya Kulighina 
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the Commerce Clause of the US Constitution), two substantial factors constrain the effi-
ciency of arbitrage in the US. 
The first is imperfect information. Arbitrageurs need comprehensive and timely in-
formation on prices in different spatial segments of the market to operate effectively. The 
US lacks such “perfect” price monitoring. For example, publication of the ACCRA Cost of 
Living Index, a thorough survey of retail prices in the US consumer market, appears 
months after the price registration period. 
Second, and probably more important, is the role played by institutions. The law of 
one price states that as soon as the price for a good has fallen in one location, arbitrageurs 
rush in, buy the good, convey it to locations where the price is higher, and then sell the 
good. The process is repeated until the difference in prices is reduced to transportation 
costs. In fact, this simplified mechanism overlooks institutional structures in the market. 
Neither the good’s supplier nor its buyer is entirely free in their selection of counteragents 
(e.g. due to long-term contracts, partnership traditions, and the reputation of potential 
counteragents). Such institutional constraints prevent some arbitrage possibilities from ever 
being realized.
2 
To obtain a crude preliminary estimate of the degree of integration of the US prod-
uct market, we use as empirical data prices for 27 grocery items across 29 cities of the 
United States in the first quarter of 2000 drawn from the ACCRA Cost of Living Index. Be-
yond a rather mundane finding that the US market is not perfectly integrated, our estimates 
tantalizingly suggest that the degrees of integration in the US and Russia (excluding diffi-
cult-to-access regions) in 2000 are fairly comparable. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly review 
the literature on US market integration. Section 3 provides a theoretical discussion of the 
empirical methodology, as well as descriptions of the econometric models and data. In sec-
tion 4, empirical results are presented. We conclude in section 5. 
   
 
 
                                                 
2 A simple thought experiment provides an example. Entrepreneur Bob observes that matches cost only half 
as much in one shop as in another. He decides to buy up all the matches in the first shop and sell them to an-
other shop at a markup. Bob obviously has no problem in accomplishing the first phase of this enterprise; it is 
the second phase that is fraught with peril. A shop would hardly purchase goods from any passer-by. Nor 
would he succeed in selling the matches just near the second shop, having no sales permit, etc.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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2  Literature on US market integration 
 
We consider here several of the key papers directly relating to market integration in the 
United States, as well as those considering the domestic US market in an international con-
text. 
Pryor (1995) studies a sample of annual prices for a number of commodity groups 
over the period 1950–1993 across five US cities. The price data are drawn from various 
sources. Eight commodity groups are tradables in which the government has little role in 
price formation. Measuring market integration by price variations, and having applied sev-
eral statistical procedures, including unit root tests, he concludes that there was no increase 
in the degree of integration of US retail markets in that 23-year period. In the period 1976–
1993, the coefficient of price variation ranged from 3.7% to 15.1%, with a 9.0% average 
across goods. 
Parsley and Wei (1996) deal with a panel of 51 prices (including those for 41 trad-
able goods) drawn from the ACCRA Cost of Living Index across 48 US cities. The panel 
covers 1975 through 1992 with quarterly frequency. Exploiting time-series analysis, they 
find prices for tradable goods converge rapidly to the law of one price: the half-life of the 
price gap is roughly four or five quarters. Nonetheless, 17% of the time series for tradables 
turned out to be non-stationary. Cechetti, Mark and Sonora (2002) perform a similar analy-
sis with the use of the consumer price index (CPI) for 19 US cities over the period 1918–
1995. They find the CPI stationary, but with a slower rate of die-out in the deviations from 
the law of one price (about nine years). The authors regard their estimates of the speed of 
price-level convergence as an upper bound on the rates that members of the EU are likely 
to experience. The data set used by O’Connell and Wei (2002) is substantially the same as 
in Parsley and Wei (1996). Each panel of price data is analyzed with a GLS unit root test, a 
threshold autoregression (TAR) estimation and a smooth threshold autoregression 
(ESTAR) estimation. The analysis reveals price discrepancies among US cities are station-
ary and that the reversion of price discrepancies is non-linear.    
Engel and Rogers (1996) apply a cross-sectional approach to examine price disper-
sion of 14 disaggregated CPIs among 23 cities of the United States and Canada to estimate 
the role of the border between these countries.
3 Although Engel and Rogers do not treat 
                                                 
3  Berkowitz and DeJong (2001) later apply this methodology in analyzing Russia’s market integration. Konstantin Gluschenko and Darya Kulighina 
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market integration as such, they apply a regression specification similar to the one used in 
this study (see section 3.1). The Engel-Rogers regressions control for the US-Canada bor-
der effect, i.e. the results can be interpreted as estimates of the degree of integration in the 
common market of the United States and Canada. 
Parsley and Wei (2001) examine the US-Japan border effect. Using the ACCRA 
Cost of Living Index as the source for the US price data (across 48 cities and 27 traded 
goods) for 1976–1997, they find price dispersion increased in the United States during 
1989–1997 (and corroborating one of our findings in section 4.2). 
Engel and Rogers (2001) exploit monthly CPI and price indexes for 43 different 
goods across 29 US cities from 1986 to 1996. Ignoring the dynamic properties of prices, 
they focus on time averages of variability in prices of similar goods across cities. They ob-
serve that, while the distance between cities partly accounts for the variation in prices, the 
largest factor driving price difference is nominal price stickiness.  
Wolf (1999) studies a cross-section of prices for 42 goods across 211 US cities with 
data drawn from a variety of sources, mainly the ACCRA Cost of Living Index. He exam-
ines the dependence of cross-city price dispersion on distance, then takes on a passel of 
other characteristics (e.g. competitive pressure measured by the number of stores, market 
size measured by population, per capita and median household income, the median house 
price as a proxy for rent, local taxes). Amazingly, all variables except the effect of distance 
have little influence on the price of goods across cities. As Wolf writes, “The most striking 
feature of the results is the absence of striking features.” 
While the literature on goods market integration in the US appears to provide little 
in the way of ready-for-use figures on degree of integration, the data in the reviewed pa-
pers above taken together suggest strongly that the US goods market is nowhere close to 
being perfectly integrated. Its degree of integration can, however, be viewed as feasible 
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3  Methodology and data 
3.1  Theory and econometric models 
 
Here is a brief restatement of the methodology used for assessing the degree of market in-
tegration in Gluschenko (2003, 2004): 
Consider a market for a tradable good consisting of a great number of spatially 
separated sub-markets (locations) {r}. Taking all variables as logarithms, let Pr be the 
price of the good in location r, Ir the per capita income, Qr = D(Pr, Ir) the demand function 
(assuming Ir is the only determinant of demand apart from price), and Qr = S(Pr) the supply 
function. (Local quantities are negligibly small compared to their total across all locations.) 
Locations are linked by arbitrageurs (also supposed to be numerous) so that no monopolis-
tic effects occur, even if the good is not produced in some locations. By moving the good 
to or from the location, arbitrageurs adjust the quantity supplied in it when the local price 
increases or decreases due to changes in local demand (e.g., because of variations in per 
capita income).  
A market is deemed integrated when such an adjustment leads prices to equalize 
across locations such that the law of one price obtains. Perfect integration implies there are 
no impediments to the movement of the good between locations, and the market operates 
like a single perfectly competitive market. Thus, the price of the good at any location is 
determined by the national market, not local demand. From the viewpoint of an individual 
location, the supply curve S is perfectly elastic. The presence of impediments to inter-
location trade causes the market to be segmented. These impediments are quantified as ar-
bitrage transaction costs Crs needed to move a unit of the good between s and r. In the 
segmented market, prices differ across locations, resulting in a dependence of local prices 
on local demand. 
From the above considerations, it follows that the dependence of local prices on lo-
cal demand could be used to detect and measure market segmentation. However, data in 
the quantities demanded here are, as a rule, unavailable. Therefore, it is more convenient to 
derive a relationship between prices and incomes as a testable version. The equilibrium 
condition 
 
D(Pr, Ir) – S(Pr)  =  0      (1) 
yields Pr = f(Ir). With some additional assumptions, f(⋅) can be represented as a log-linear Konstantin Gluschenko and Darya Kulighina 
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function 
Pr = κ + βIr. (2) 
 
Subtracting (2) for some location s from that for r, an equation in terms of percentage dif-
ferentials, Prs ≡ Pr – Ps, Irs ≡ Ir – Is, gives (throughout the paper, r and s are arranged so that 
Prs ≥ 0): 
 
 Prs = βIrs. (3) 
 
As (1) holds for each Ir, the derivative of its left-hand side with respect to Ir equals zero. 
From this we obtain 
 
dPr/dIr = –εI/(εD – εS), (4) 
 
where εI is the income elasticity of demand, and εD and εS are the price elasticities of de-
mand and supply. Hence, β = dPr/dIr ≥ 0. With finite εS, β is positive. However, β = 0 in a 
perfectly integrated market, i.e. β vanishes as supply approaches perfect elasticity (εS → 
∞). 
Thus, relationship (3) can be used as a cross-sectional test for market segmentation. 
A positive value of β indicates that local markets are not perfectly integrated.  The magni-
tude of β (the elasticity of price dispersion vis-à-vis income dispersion) can be used as a 
measure of the degree of market segmentation: a higher value for β means weaker integra-
tion (or higher segmentation). If  β = 0 holds over a set {(r, s)}, implying the law of one 
price holds, then the relevant market can be deemed integrated.  
On the other hand, the price differential equals arbitrage transaction costs Prs = Crs, 
so βIrs = Crs. In a large country, segmentation of markets by physical distance is inevitable. 
Under a weaker version of the law of one price, equality of prices takes into account trans-
portation costs, Trs. Thus, that the degree of integration, β, is measured as arbitrage transac-
tion costs minus transportation costs, whereby Prs – Trs = βIrs or Prs = βIrs + Trs. By assum-
ing transportation costs to be log-linear function of distance, Trs = α + γLrs, the following 
equation is arrived at: BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/ 2006 
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Prs = α + βIrs + γLrs, (5) 
 
where Lrs is log distance separating locations r and s. If arbitrage transaction costs are 
nothing but the costs of shipping goods, i.e., Crs = Trs, then it will be β = 0 and the market 
is recognized as integrated. Taking into account random shocks, εrs, we obtain an econo-
metric version of (5): 
 
Prs = α + βIrs + γLrs + εrs. (6) 
 
This regression is estimated over a set of N×(N–1)/2 location pairs; N is the number of lo-
cations. 
Here we make a caveat about distribution and marketing services, a non-tradable 
component of tradable goods. Not only did we fail to find data on distribution costs in the 
US product market, our discussions with American economists suggest no such informa-
tion exists. On the other hand, the noisiness of the distribution cost variable in market inte-
gration estimations could be taken to mean its role is not as crucial as is customarily 
deemed in the literature. Indeed, omitting this variable does not change the qualitative pat-
tern of Russia’s market integration; and quantitative changes are minor, if any; see 
Gluschenko (2003, 2004). Of course, this may not the case in the US market, so we pro-
pose two ways to deal with the problem. The first is to interpret β as the upper limit of the 
degree of segmentation, and not as the degree itself. The second is to deem difference in 
distribution costs as an additional indication of imperfect integration, i.e. to consider joint 
integration of the goods market and the market for distribution services (a wider notion of 
market integration). 
Benefiting from the fact that Prs = Crs, the latter equation can be modified so that it 
can estimate roles played by various factors in market segmentation. After modification,  
Prs = α + β
*Irs + γLrs + ΣkαkXkrs + εrs, (7) 
 
where Xkrs is a variable characterizing k-th factor for pair (r, s). The meaning of the 
coefficient on income differential in this equation differs from that in (6): β
* indicates the 
total effect of unidentified factors rather than degree of market segmentation. We reasona-
bly expect that β
* < β. Konstantin Gluschenko and Darya Kulighina 
 
 Assessing a feasible degree of product  




  14 
As mentioned in Section 2, there is a specification among regressions run by Engel and 
Rogers (1996) that can be correlated to some extent with (6). Their dependent variable is 
the volatility of the price differential; the explanatory variables are distance, the US-
Canada border dummy, and the volatility of the differential of real wages for manufactur-
ing employees. As wages apparently are strongly correlated with personal incomes, the lat-
ter variable may be considered as an analogue of Irs in (6). Interpreting results obtained, 
Engel and Rogers assign the entire effect of wage dispersion to the difference in non-
tradable marketing services. This seems to us questionable. Most probably, the wage dis-
persion variable captures a dependence of prices on local demands that is caused by imper-
fect goods market integration (maybe, however, along with the effect of the difference in 
distribution costs). When Engel and Rogers add the wage dispersion variable, this does not 
much affect the border coefficient, but markedly reduces the distance coefficient.
4 As 
might be supposed, this suggests that the border variable almost fully reflects the impact of 
impediments to trans-border trade, while the wage dispersion variable captures the effect 
of impediments to intra-country arbitrage within both the United States and Canada.  
 
3.2  Data 
 
The price data for the analysis are drawn from the ACCRA Cost of Living Index bulletin.
5 
Each quarterly issue of the Index contains comparative average prices for 59 goods and 
services, as well as the composite cost-of-living index and six components indexes across 
about 300 US cities. Note that prices reported do not include sale taxes. To deal with trad-
able goods, we use the grocery-items index as a price representative. This index is based 
on the cost of a basket of 27 grocery goods relative to the national average cost. Thus, 
) / ln( ) / ln( ) / ln(
1 1






i s g r g rs p p α p p α p p P ∑ ∑
= =
− = = , 
where p(g)l is the grocery-items index in location l, i indexes individual goods from 
the grocery basket (i=1,…,n; n=27), pil is the price of i-th good in l, pi is the (arithmetic) 
                                                 
4 Although not reported in Gluschenko (2004), it was experimented with deleting Irs from (6) while analysing 
Russia’s market integration. In doing so, changes in the distance coefficient were similar to those observed by 
Engel and Rogers, even controlling for distribution costs. 
5 ACCRA formerly stood for the American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association. Nowadays, it is 
simply the institution’s name, and not the abbreviation. Although ACCRA is a non-governmental institution, 
its data can be considered as almost official, since it is included in the Statistical Abstracts of the United 
States. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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cross-section mean of prices for i-th good, and αi is the weight of i-th good in the the gro-
cery basket. Weights are largely based on data from the US Bureau of Labour Statistics’ 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (1992 in our case; see ACCRA, 2000b). The goods are 
listed in Appendix;  for detailed definitions and the values of the good weights, see AC-
CRA (2000a, b). This variable is hereafter referred to as “the cost of the grocery basket.” 
Another version of the price variable, the geometric mean of prices for goods be-
























) ) / ln(( . 
This variable is referred to as “the average grocery price.”
6 
For the pilot analysis, we use the data for the first quarter of 2000 from ACCRA (2000a). 
The spatial sample covers 29 cities (i.e. 406 city pairs) located in different states. Appendix 
provides the list of these cities. The value of the income variable is computed from yearly 
per capita personal incomes by metropolitan statistical area. The data source is the website 
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
7 Distance is defined as the shortest highway 
distance between cities; distance values are taken from the Map Quest website.
8  
We use two additional variables: city population and crime rate. Population values 
are drawn from the BEA website.
9 Crime rates are those by state; the data source is U.S. 












                                                 
6 Both versions of the price variable can be interpreted as (spatial) price index numbers. The first one is the 
Scrope index with the reference quantities being those in the national average market basket; the second ver-
sion is the Jevons index (Diewert, 1987).  
7  www.bea.gov/bea/regional/reis, Series CA1-3, Per Capita Personal Income, Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 
2000. 
8  www.mapquest.com. 
9  www.bea.gov/bea/regional/reis, Series CA1-3, Population, Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2000. Konstantin Gluschenko and Darya Kulighina 
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4  Empirical results 
4.1  Estimates 
 
Table 1 reports summary statistics, providing a pattern of price dispersion across US cities 
comprising our spatial sample. The statistics are computed over city pairs. Both the mean 
of the absolute price differential (which coincides with the average of Prs, since the Prs are 
set non-negative) and the standard deviation characterize the spatial variation of prices. 
The spread, which is the difference between the maximum and the minimum of the price 
differential, gives an idea of the range of price differences (as the minimum approaches 
zero, the spread almost coincides with the maximal price differential).  
 
Table 1  Summary statistics 
Version of variable  Mean  Standard deviation  Spread 
Cost of the grocery basket  0.059  0.042  0.213 
Average  grocery  price  0.056 0.040 0.203 
 
Price variability of the cost of the grocery basket appears to exceed that of the average gro-
cery price, so we conclude that prices for goods with a greater share in the basket (i.e. 
greater weight) are more variable across space. In real, not logarithmic, terms, the mean 
price difference equals 6.1% and 5.8%, with standard deviations of 4.3% and 4.0%, respec-
tively. The maximal differences in prices are equal to 23.8% and 22.5%.
10 
While this pattern is hardly compatible with the law of one price in its strict form, it 
is not inconceivable that we are merely observing a snapshot of purely random shocks dis-
tributed in space or that all price differences are due entirely to the combination of trans-
portation costs and random shocks. This would imply that the law of one price holds statis-
tically in either strict or weakened version, and hence, the market is integrated. Estimates 
of the test equation (6) reveal whether that is the case.  
The estimation results are presented in Table 2. The standard errors in this table and 
in Table 3 below are the White heteroscedasticity-consistent errors. 
                                                 
10 Taking the entire spatial sample from ACCRA (2000), except for New York City and Alaskan cities, the 
spread of the cost of the grocery basket equals 57.1% (with Victoria, Texas, and Sacramento, California, as 
the low and high ends; the cost of the basket is 77.6% of the national average in the former, and 121.9% in 
the latter).   BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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Table 2   Integration of the US product market 
Coefficient (variable)  Estimate Standard  error  p-value 
Dependent variable: The cost of the grocery basket 
β (income)  0.0552 0.0103  0.000 
γ (distance)  0.0029 0.0032  0.360 
Dependent variable: Average grocery price 
β (income)  0.0471 0.0102  0.000 
γ (distance)  0.0054 0.0030  0.067 
 
The coefficient on income, β, (i.e. the degree of market segmentation) is highly significant 
at the levels of less than 0.1% for both versions of the dependent variable. Thus, the US 
product market cannot be deemed as completely integrated. The values of β imply that a 
rise in the inter-city income difference by 10% results in an increase in the grocery price 
difference of about 0.5%.  
The coefficient on distance, γ, has the expected positive sign in both regressions. It 
is insignificant (at the 10% level) in the regression of the cost of the grocery basket, but is 
significant at the 10% level when the dependent variable is the average grocery price. A 
possible explanation is that the goods where transportation costs contribute markedly to 
prices have small weights in the basket. Therefore, in the average grocery price, where all 
goods are equipollent, the effect of distance is more pronounced. On the other hand, the 
insignificance of distance in the first regression may be due to the small size of our city 
sample. 
Unfortunately, there are limited possibilities to quantify factors that might explain 
market segmentation. No indicators characterize completeness and timeliness of informa-
tion on the market situation or the institutional impediments to arbitrage. Moreover, indica-
tors that might reveal market segmentation turn out to be highly correlated with other ex-
planatory variables. Only two factors stand out: city size (population) and the crime rate 
(total number of reported offences per 100,000 population). 
The size of city can put both upward and downward pressure on prices. The larger 
the city, the broader the market and lower the prices. Conversely, costs of retail trade may 
be higher in big cities, in particular, due to higher rents. This makes it impossible to antici-
pate the sign of the coefficient on this variable. As for the crime rate, it is expected that Konstantin Gluschenko and Darya Kulighina 
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higher crime leads to higher prices due to higher security costs (or payoffs to racketeers). 
Estimates of model (7) are presented in Table 3. 
   
Table 3   Factors influencing market segmentation 
 
Coefficient (variable)  Estimate Standard  error  p-value 
Dependent variable: The cost of the grocery basket 
β
* (income)  0.0310 0.0153  0.043 
γ (distance)  0.0027 0.0032  0.397 
α1 (size of city)  0.0047 0.0018  0.008 
α2 (crime rate)  0.0019 0.0038  0.616 
Dependent variable: Average grocery price 
β
* (income)  0.0399 0.0148  0.007 
γ (distance)  0.0050 0.0030  0.094 
α1 (size of city)  0.0032 0.0017  0.060 
α2 (crime rate)  0.0139 0.0036  0.000 
 
As expected, Tables 2 and 3 show that the value of β
* decreases compared to β. 
Hence, our additional factors contribute to inter-city price dispersion. The size of city is 
significant in both regressions (at the levels of 1% and 10%) with positive coefficients (i.e. 
the larger the city, the higher the prices). The coefficient on crime rate has the expected 
positive sign. However, this variable is significant only in regression of the average gro-
cery price. From this, we merely infer that the crime rate probably affects prices in US cit-
ies (We cannot draw a more definite conclusion, since the proxy of crime rate is state-
specific rather than city-specific). 
The estimates from Table 3, which are elasticities, suggest that sensitivity of prices 
to changes in explanatory variables is rather low. Therefore, these values by themselves do 
not indicate the significance of a particular factor in causing inter-city price differences. 
Following Engel and Rogers (1996), the economic significance of an explanatory variable 
can be measured by the contribution of its average to the average of the dependent vari-
able. Since it follows from (7) that  2 2 1 1
* α ˆ α ˆ γ ˆ β ˆ α ˆ X X L I P + + + + = , the contribution of a 
variable, say X1, to the average price dispersion may be calculated as  P X / α ˆ 1 1 . On the 
other hand, a portion in the total (average) price dispersion is due to the natural, unavoid-
able market friction caused by the spatial separation of cities. That is why we also compute BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/ 2006 
 
  19 
the contribution of the explanatory variables to price dispersion less its “natural” part, i.e. 
with the appropriate reduction for distance in average price dispersion: 
)) γ ˆ α ˆ ( /( α ˆ 1 1 L P X + − . Table 4 reports the results.  
   




Contribution to the total price dis-
persion 
Contribution to the price dispersion 
less the geographically determined 
one 
  Basket  Average price  Basket  Average price 
Unidentified factors  3.6  4.2  36.8  33.9 
Distance 90.2  87.6  –  – 
Size of city  5.9  4.8  60.2  38.3 
Crime rate   0.3  3.5  3.0  27.8 
 
The predominant contribution to price dispersion pertains to transportation costs 
proxied by distance and determines about 90% of the inter-city price difference. About 5% 
to 6% more is due to difference in size of cities. Evidence of the two regressions is dis-
crepant as to the contribution of crime. Taking the grocery basket, crime is responsible for 
only 0.3% of dispersion of its cost, while it is responsible for 3.5% of dispersion of the av-
erage grocery price. Other unidentified factors yield about 4% of differences in prices. Un-
known factors determine more than a third of price dispersion cleaned of the effect of 
transportation costs. The difference in size of cities yields 40% to 60%, and crime is re-
sponsible for 3% to 30%. 
 
4.2  Comparison with Russia  
 
Some insight into possible difference of Russia’s goods market integration from that of the 
US market can be gained from comparison of price dispersion in both markets. Figure 1 
depicts time series of standard deviations of the log costs of the US grocery basket and the 
Russian staples basket; the latter is also normalized to the national average. 
In contrast to the regression analysis reported above, standard deviations are com-
puted over entire city samples as they appear in the ACCRA (1992–2002) bulletins. These 
samples vary across time both in the sample size, covering 294 to 330 cities (Canadian cit-
ies excluded), and in the set of cities. Changes in product weights occurred during the pe-
riod under consideration.  Konstantin Gluschenko and Darya Kulighina 
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The Russian staples basket represents 25 food goods for 1992 through 2000; see 
Gluschenko (2003) for a description. In June 2000, Goskomstat introduced a 33-food bas-
ket, so the cost of the 25-food basket is unavailable after 2000. To obtain a time match 
with the US series, we geometrically average the Russian monthly data over each quarter 
(for the first quarter of 1992, over two months, February and March).
11  
 











































Basket of 25 staples, Russia as a whole
Basket of 33 staples, Russia as a whole
Basket of 25 staples, Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions
Basket of 33 staples, Russia excluding difficult-to-access regions  
 
The standard deviations for Russia are computed over two spatial samples. The first com-
prises 74 of Russia’s 89 regions for which the price data is available. In the second sample, 
five difficult-to-access regions (Murmansk Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Yakutia, Kamchatka, 
and Sakhalin) that cannot be involved in bilateral arbitrage are omitted. For the United 
States, we should similarly classify Alaska, Hawaii and the Virgin Islands as difficult to 
access. These territories, indeed, increase price dispersion across US cities, but only to a 
minor extent. For example, when Alaskan cities are excluded, the standard deviation in 
2000:I decreases from 0.079 to 0.076. For this reason, we do not separate out Alaska, Ha-
waii, and Virgin Islands. 
                                                 
11 In 1999-2003, there were regional sale taxes in Russia. However, they had a minor impact on cross-region 
price variability, if any. First, these taxes did not vary much across regions, as they had prescribed upper BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 3/ 2006 
 
  21 
Figure 1 suggests that price dispersion in the Russian market (represented by the staples 
baskets) became comparable with that of the US market (represented by the grocery bas-
ket) by the early 2000s. Curiously, while dispersion of prices in Russia rapidly falls, stabi-
lizing at the end of 1999, it slowly rises in the United States. Maybe, this is an artifact 
caused by the variability of spatial sample over time. However, Parsley and Wei (2001), 
having uniformed the ACCRA spatial samples, find the mode of the price differential dis-
tribution to shift from a near-zero value in 1985 to a positive one in 1990, and the standard 
deviation to rise during 1989–1997. Certainly, it is not inconceivable that prices in the US 
market slowly diverged in that period (and indeed may offer an interesting topic for further 
research.) Overall, basing on the pattern of price dispersion, it can be expected that, in the 
recent years, market segmentation in Russia, excluding difficult-to-access regions, ap-
proximates that of the US market, or, at least, they are of the same order of magnitude. 
Comparing regression estimates, the degree of market segmentation in Russia as a 
whole in 2000 is about twice as high as in the United States. According to Gluschenko 
(2003), the value of β estimated over yearly averaged costs of the basket of 25 foods 
equals to 0.116 for 2000; averaging monthly values of β over 2000 yields 0.112. However, 
taking account of the specificity of Russia’s economic geography, it seems somewhat un-
reasonable to compare the entire Russian market with the US market. Comparison of Rus-
sia excluding difficult-to-access regions gives a far more similar picture. For this part of 
the Russian market, the respective values of β are 0.061 and 0.059.  
Thus, the degrees of integration of the US and Russian (excluding difficult-to-
access regions) markets are quite close. From the statistical viewpoint, they almost coin-
cide: the 95% confidence intervals of estimates for the US market are [0.035, 0.075] when 
the cost of the grocery basket is used, and [0.027, 0.067] for the average grocery price, 
while it is [0.053, 0.070] for the yearly β in Russia.  
No great significance should be attached to this striking result, since the US spatial 
sample used for the pilot analysis is so small. There are external grounds to believe that the 
Russian market is less integrated than the US. What may be concluded from the results 
here is that the degree of Russia’s market integration has become comparable with that of 
the US market.   
                                                                                                                                                    
bound of 5%. Second, when the sale taxes were abolished, local retail prices did not change at all. Konstantin Gluschenko and Darya Kulighina 
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The coefficient on distance, γ, in Table 2 turns out to be one order of magnitude 
smaller than the estimate for Russia, excluding difficult-to-access regions (0.034 to 0.037). 
This is comparable by order of magnitude with estimates for the European part of Russia. 
This seems reasonable, since the average distance between US cities in our sample is about 
1,500 kilometers compared to 1,100 kilometers between regional capitals in the European 
part of Russia. The figure for Russia, excluding difficult-to-access regions, is 2,600 kilo-
meters.   
 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we attempted to get a general idea of the degree of integration (or segmenta-
tion) of the US market. Using a subsample of a cross-section of US cities for our pilot 
analysis, we found strong evidence of US market segmentation. Further, supposing that the 
US market is the most integrated among territorially large markets, its thoroughly esti-
mated degree of integration may be deemed as the maximal feasible degree of integration 
and used as a benchmark against which integration of other markets (e.g. China, India, the 
European Union) may be measured. Here, we looked at Russia. 
Comparing our preliminary estimates of the degree of market integration in the United 
States with estimates for Russia, we note that integration of the Russian market excluding 
difficult-to-excess regions had become comparable with that of the US market by the early 
2000s, i.e. market integration in Russia is presently quite strong.  
These results are, of course, preliminary. They are based on a small spatial sample 
and some indicators are quite rough. Rather than rely on these crude estimates, it is suffi-
cient here to note the orders of magnitude suggested and the qualitative pattern rather than 
the quantitative. Our further research will substantially widen the spatial sample and esti-
mate integration of the US market across a number of points in time.
12  
                                                 
12 We still hope that it is possible to take account of nontradable inputs (distribution costs) in the US market. 
We would be greatly indebted to anyone who could advise on ways to proxy them. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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Appendix:  Data details 
 
Product sample 
T-bone steak; ground beef/hamburger; sausage; frying chicken; chunk light tuna; whole 
milk; eggs; margarine; grated parmesan cheese; potatoes; bananas; iceberg lettuce; white 
bread; cigarettes; vacuum-packed coffee; sugar; corn flakes; sweet peas; tomatoes; 
peaches; facial tissues; dishwashing powder; shortening; frozen orange juice; frozen corn; 
baby food; soft drink. 
See ACCRA (2000) for detailed goods definitions. 
 
Spatial sample (city and state)  
Mobile, AL; Jonesboro, AR; Colorado Springs, CO; Jacksonville, FL; Americus, GA; 
Boise, ID; Quincy, IL; Bloomington, IN; Waterloo, IA; Garden City, KS; Murray, KY; 
Lake Charles, LA; St. Cloud, MN; Columbia, MO; Lincoln, NE; Las Cruces, NM; Bing-
hamton, NY; Greenville, NC; Mansfield, OH; Oklahoma City, OK; Salem, OR; Philadel-
phia, PA; Columbia, SC; Vermillion, SD; Knoxville, TN; Amarillo, TX; Lynchburg, VA; 
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